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COMMENTS
EXPERT TESTIMONY AND VOICE SPECTROGRAM ANALYSIS
United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975)
Petitioner was convicted by a jury on four counts of telephoning
bomb threats in violation of the Federal Bomb Threat Statute.' He
appealed, claiming prejudicial error from denial of his pretrial motion
to suppress expert testimony identifying his voice by spectrogram analy-
sis.2  The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed and held:
Expert opinion based on scientific techniques is admissible provided the
techniques involve a "demonstrable, objective procedure" that may be
duplicated or criticized by other experts.'
Voice spectrogram4 analysis is a recently developed5 scientific tech-
1. 18 U.S.C. § 844(e) (1970). During 1972 and early 1973 the Shoemaker Coal
Mine in Benwood, West Virginia, received numerous telephoned bomb threats. To iden-
tify the party or parties making the phone calls, mine clerks tape-recorded four telephone
calls with equipment provided by the Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company.
After the fourth call was traced to the defendant's residence, federal agents arrested de-
fendant and charged him with four counts of violating the Federal Bomb Threat Statute.
Brief for Appellee at 1, United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975). Tapes
of the bomb threats and a voice exemplar voluntarily provided by the defendant were
sent to Lieutenant Ernest W. Nash of the Michigan State Police for spectrogram analy-
sis. At the trial Lt. Nash, a recognized expert in voice spectrogram analysis, testified
that "Bailer's voice positively matched that of the person who made the first three calls,"
but he was unable to make a conclusive determination about the call traced to defend-
ant's residence. United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 464 (4th Cir. 1975). The de-
fense presented no expert witnesses to rebut Lt. Nash's conclusions. Defendant was con-
victed and sentenced to four two-year concurrent terms on the four counts. Brief for
Appellee at 2, supra.
2. Brief for Appellee at 1-2, United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.
1975).
3. United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975).
4. Voice spectrograms are occasionally called "voiceprints." The use of the word
"voiceprint" implies a similarity to "fingerprint" and should be avoided because there
is doubt whether voice spectrogram analysis is as reliable as fingerprint identification.
Id. at 465 n.1; see 56 MINN. L. Rav. 1235, 1236 n.2 (1972); notes 13-15 infra and ac-
companying text.
5. The spectrograph machine was invented in the 1940's at the Bell Telephone
Laboratories in New Jersey. State v. Cary, 99 NJ. Super. 323, 325, 239 A.2d 680, 681
(Super. Ct. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970); Kamine, The
Voiceprint Technique: Its Structure and Reliability, 6 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 213, 218
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nique which can identify a person by analysis of his voice.' An
exemplar of an individual's voice is tape-recorded.7 The exemplar and
the tape-recording containing the unknown voice are fed into the spec-
trograph machine which scans the two tapes and makes graphic repre-
sentations of the two speech patterns.8  An examiner then visually
compares the graphs and listens to the tapes to determine whether one
voice made both speech impressions. 9 The technique was considered
unreliable' 0 until, in 1972, Dr. Oscar Tosi" of Michigan State Universi-
(1969). It was not until the 1960's, however, that Lawrence G. Kersta, an electrical
engineer and physicist employed at the Bell Laboratories, developed the voice spectro-
gram technique. State v. Cary, supra at 328, 239 A.2d at 682.
6. There are two methods of voice identification: aural recognition and voice spec-
trogram analysis. The former has long been held admissible into evidence. See, e.g.,
Mack v. State, 54 Fla. 55, 44 So. 706 (1907) (rape victim identified accused attacker
solely from having heard his voice). See generally 2 J. WIGMoRE, A TnnATIsp ON THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAV § 660 (3d ed.
1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 995 (1960).
7. The United States Supreme Court has held that compelling an accused to repeat
words for voice identification is not violative of the fifth amendment protection against
self-incrimination. The Court reasoned that this procedure did not involve testimonial
compulsion, but rather was an identification of physical characteristics. United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967); accord, United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1
(1973); see People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, 533-34, 421 P.2d 393, 394-95, 55 Cal. Rptr.
385, 386-87 (1966). See generally Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
8. The graph portrays three aspects of sound and their correlative components in
human speech. The horizontal axis of the graph charts time, a constant that is particu-
larized by the timing of the individual's speech. The vertical axis measures frequency,
the number of sound vibrations in a specific time period, perceived by a listener as pitch.
The plotting line of the graph varies in darkness, representing the intensity of the voice,
recognized by a listener as loudness. Kamine, supra note 5, at 218-20; 56 MINN. L.
REv. 1235, 1239 (1972), citing M. HECKER, SPEAKER RECOGNMON: AN INTERPRETIVE
SURVEY OF TE LrrERATuR 50-51 (Am. Speech & Hearing Ass'n Monograph No. 16,
1971),
9. The most extensive study found that the error rate using only visual inspection
of the spectrograms was six percent. The study noted, however, that allowing the expert
examiner both to listen to the tape and to analyze the spectrograms visually reduced the
error rate to two percent. Tosi, Oyer, Lashbrook, Pedrey, Nicol & Nash, Experiment on
Voice Identification, 51 J. Acousr. Soc. AM. 2030, 2037, 2041 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Tosi].
10. The first scientific study of the technique claimed that voice spectrogram analy-
sis was a perfectly reliable method of voice identification. Kersta, Voiceprint Identifi-
cation, 196 NATURE 1253, 1253 (1962). Kersta, however, was criticized for failing to
disclose the methodology of his experiments, thus preventing reproduction and verifica-
tion of his results. In addition, he was attacked because his laboratory simulations did
not reflect actual conditions. See Ladefoged & Van Derslice, The "Voiceprint My-
stique," WORKING PAPERS IN PHONETICS 7 (1967). Kersta was further criticized for us-
ing only closed speaker groups, that is, the spectrogram of the unknown voice was al-
ways included in the group of spectrograms of test voices, and the examiner was aware
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ty published a study claiming voice spectrogram analysis was 98 percent
accurate, 12 a figure comparable to the reliability of other scientific
techniques that are regularly used to develop admissible expert opin-
ion. s
The admissibility of evidence is largely within the discretion of the
trial judge.14 Opinions of qualified experts' 5 are admissible into evi-
of its presence. United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641, 643 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd
on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Since Kersta was not only the innovator of the process, but was producing and selling
the spectrograph machine, self-interest may have biased his results. Cederbaums, Voice-
print Identification: A Scientific and Legal Dilemma, 5 CiuM. L. BULL. 323, 328
(1969). As a result of these criticisms, the scientific community generally concluded
that the reliability of voice spectrogram analysis had been insufficiently proven. Bolt,
Cooper, David, Denes, Pickett & Stevens, Speaker Identification by Speech Spectro-
grams: A Scientists' [sic] View of Its Reliability for Legal Purposes, 47 J. ACOUST. Soc.
AM. 597, 603 (1970).
11. Dr. Tosi, Professor of Acoustics at Michigan State University, has a Ph.D. in
Audiology and Speech Sciences from Ohio State University and the equivalent of a
Ph.D. in Physics and Engineering from Buenos Aires University. People v. Law, 40
Cal. App. 3d 69,73 n.2, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708, 710 n.2 (1974).
12. Tosi 2041. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the United
States Department of Justice funded a $300,000 grant to Dr. Tosi to study voice spectro-
gram analysis for forensic use. State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 453, 192
N.W.2d 432,438 (1972), noted in 56 MINN. L. RV. 1235 (1972).
The study, conducted over a period of two and one-half years, involved 250 speakers
and 50,000 spectrograms. It corrected a major defect of Kersta's work, see note 10 su-
pra, by using open groups, that is, the spectrogram of the unknown voice was not neces-
sarily included in the spectrograms of all the test voices. Based on the results of these
experiments, Dr. Tosi concluded that an experienced operator, such as Lt. Nash, could
correctly identify a speaker 94 percent of the time, and suggested that with certain re-
finements. see note 9 supra, the percentage could be increased to 98 percent. Tosi 2041;
see 56 MINN. L. REv. 1235, 1241-44 (1972).
13. The science of personal identification by means of fingerprints is claimed to be
100 percent accurate since there has never been a reported case in which two separate
fingerprints were identical in all respects. Inbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases:
II1. Fingerprints and Palm-prints, 25 J. CuM. L. & C. 500, 502 (1934). Generally,
absolute identification requires that there be 12 or more points of identity between the
exemplar and the evidence print. Fewer points of identity create only a presumption
whose strength is dependent on the number and clarity of the points. Id. at 502, 503.
Ballistics testing is also said to be 100 percent accurate. A bullet may contain as
many as 100 individual characteristics that can be compared with the exemplar, so that
there will be a sufficient number of points for matching. Inbau, Scientific Evidence in
Criminal Cases: I. Firearms Identification--"Ballistics," 24 J. CRIM. L. & C. 825, 827-
28 (1933). On the other hand, "under the most favorable conditions" polygraph results,
not generally admissible into evidence, are 95 percent accurate. F. INBAU & J. REID, LIE
DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 72 (3d ed. 1954). Even this figure has been
attacked as exaggerated. See Levitt, Scientific Evaluation of the "Lie Detector," 40
IOWA L. REv. 440, 450 (1955); Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An
Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70 YALE LJ. 694, 699 (1961).
14. United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 437 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.Washington University Open Scholarship
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dence as an exception to the general rule prohibiting opinion testimony
by witnesses. 16 When expert opinion is based upon a scientific tech-
nique, courts generally follow the standard of Frye v. United States"
994 (1971); United States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796, 800 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); Fineberg v. United States, 393 F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir.
1968); Leavitt v. Scott, 338 F.2d 749, 751 (10th Cir. 1964); Slough, Relevancy Unrav-
eled, 5 KAN. L. REV. 1, 1-4, 11, 12 (1956).
15. Dean McCormick described the considerations governing qualifying a witness as
an expert:
An observer is qualified to testify because he has firsthand knowledge of the
situation or transaction at issue. The expert has something different to con-
tribute. This is a power to draw inferences from the facts which a jury would
not be competent to draw. To warrant the use of expert testimony, then, two
elements are required. First, the subject of the inference must be so distinc-
tively related to some science, profession, business or occupation as to be be-
yond the ken of the average layman. . . . Second, the witness must have suf-
ficient skill, knowledge or experience in that field or calling as to make it ap-
pear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the trier in his search for
truth. The knowledge may in some fields be derived from reading alone, in
some from practice alone, or as is more commonly the case, from both.
C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13 (2d ed. 1972) (footnotes
omitted) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMIcK]. See also 7 WIGMORE
§ 1923; Gair, Selecting and Preparing Expert Witnesses, 2 AM. JuR. TRIALS 585 (1964);
Kirk, Locating Scientific and Technical Experts, 2 AM. JuR. TRIALS 293 (1964). A wit-
ness' qualification as an expert is an issue within the trial court's discretion which may
be reviewed only for abuse. Fineberg v. United States, 393 F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir.
1968); Formhals v. United States, 278 F.2d 43, 47 (9th Cir. 1960); Lelles v. United
States, 241 F.2d 21, 26 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 974 (1957); McCoRMICK §
13.
In federal courts and about 15 state courts the judge may comment and advise the
jury on the probative value of the evidence. M. LADD & R. CARLSON, CASES AND MA-
TERIALS ON EVIDENCE 101 n.2 (1972); see 9 WIGMORE §§ 2551, 2551a. Even though
the trial court finds the witness to be qualified and admits his testimony, the jury may
consider his qualifications in determining the weight to be given his testimony. People
v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 444, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478, 483 (1968); Pfingsten v. West-
enhaver, 39 Cal. 2d 12, 20, 244 P.2d 395, 400 (1952). An expert's opinion, even if
uncontradicted, does not bind the jury, which may give the evidence whatever weight
it desires. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620-27 (1944). See Feguer
v. United States, 302 F.2d 214, 242 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 872 (1972);
United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641, 645 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd on other grounds
sub norn. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974); State ex rel. Trim-
ble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 456, 192 N.W.2d 432, 440 (1972); cf. Worley v. State,
263 So. 2d 613, 615 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (Mager, J., concurring). See generally
J. RICHARDSON, MODERN ScIEmNIFc EVIDENCE § 5.12 (1961). Since it is the jury's re-
sponsibility to evaluate the credibility of a witness, an appellate court will not review
the jury's determination. United States v. Sierra, 452 F.2d 291, 293 (10th Cir. 1971);
see Chavez v. United States, 258 F.2d 816, 819 (10th Cir. 1958).
16. See McCORMICK §§ 11, 13; 7 WIGMOPE §§ 1917, 1925.
17. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The court held inadmissible expert testimony
based on the results of the Marston systolic blood pressure deception test (polygraph
test) because the technique
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that such testimony is admissible only if the method has achieved "gen-
eral acceptance" in its field.18 The Frye standard is intended to prevent
ha[d] not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physio-
logical and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting
expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments
thus far made.
Id. at 1014. See note 18 infra.
18. Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction
is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs.
293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added).
The Frye standard of "general acceptance" is "the guiding principle in the field of
scientific evidence." E. CoNRAD, MODERN TRIAL EVIDENCE § 711, at 697 (Supp. 1960).
See United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994
(1971) (neutron activation analysis held admissible); Marks v. United States, 260 F.2d
377 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 929 (1959) (lie detector test held inadmis-
sible); People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38 N.W.2d 322 (1949) (Hauser breath test held
inadmissible); cf. Brooke v. People, 139 Colo. 388, 339 P.2d 993 (1959) (no citation
of Frye, but paraffin test held inadmissible under Frye standard of "general acceptance"
in its field). See also Kleri, Judicial Notice of Scientific Facts, 15 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV.
140 (1966). But see United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal. 1972)
(Frye standard criticized but followed); Brooke v. People, supra at 395, 339 P.2d at 997
(Knauss, C.J., dissenting).
While the Frye standard is "general acceptance in the field in which it belongs," Frye
v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), courts generally incorrectly de-
scribe the test as "general scientific acceptance." See, e.g., United States v. Sample, 378
F. Supp. 44, 53 (1974); State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 332, 239 A.2d 680, 684
(Super. Ct. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970).
Some courts have liberalized the general acceptance rule. In ruling on the admissibil-
ity of the results of a Nalline test to determine narcotics addiction, a California court
of appeals stated:
Each of the People's experts did admit on cross-examination that the medical
profession generally is unfamiliar with the use of Nalline and therefore it can-
not be truthfully said that the Nalline test has met with general acceptance by
the medical profession as a whole ....
Should this fact render the testimony inadmissible? We believe not. . . . It
has been generally accepted by those who would be expected to be familiar
with its use. In this age of specialization more should not be required.
People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d 858, 861-62, 331 P.2d 251, 254 (1958) (emphasis
added). Two commentators have espoused the less rigorous Williams approach. See
J. REI & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION: THE POLYGRAPH ("LIE-DETEcToR") TECH-
NIQUE 3 (1966); O'Connor, "That's the Man": A Sobering Study of Eye-Witness Iden-
dfication and the Polygraph, 49 ST. JoHN'S L REv. 1, 19 (1975), cited in United States
v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 164 (8th Cir. 1975).
The Frye principle was significantly weakened in Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So. 2d 120 (1969), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 927 (1970). In upholding the admissibility of a new technique devised to detect
Washington University Open Scholarship
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juries from being unduly influenced by expert testimony based on ques-
tionable scientific techniques10 and to guarantee that there will be other
experts available to judge the accuracy of the method. 20 Prior to 1972,
two of the three appellate courts that considered the issue excluded
testimony based on the results of voice spectrogram analysis because the
technique had not achieved the acceptance required by Frye.21 Since
whether unusually high amounts of succinylcholine chloride, a poison, were present in
the deceased's body, the court reversed the burden of the Frye test:
The problem presented to the trial judge was, were the scientific tests per-
formed by Umberger [a toxicologist who performed the chemical analysis]
so unreliable and scientifically unacceptable that their admission into evidence
was error.
223 So. 2d at 70 (emphasis added).
19. "[Slcientific proof may in some instances assume a posture of mystic infallibil-
ity in the eyes of a jury of laymen . . . ." United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741,
744 (1974). Courts and commentators fear that juries will accept without question the
technique, and therefore the result, thus attributing absolute veracity to the testimony
when there is possibility of error. See United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168
(8th Cir. 1975) (polygraph evidence "likely to be shrouded with an aura of near infalli-
bility, akin to the ancient oracle of Delphi"); People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 461,
72 Cal. Rptr. 478, 493 (1968); George, Scientific Investigation and Defendants' Rights,
57 Mftc. L Rnv. 37, 39 (1958). One writer has stated: "Mhe vulnerability of
the scientist's testimony increases in proportion to the paucity of measurements and
unproved reliability of his analytical technique." Kramer, Scientific Evidence in
the Law, 53 A.B.A.J. 165, 166 (1967).
20. Commonwealth v. Lykus, - Mass. -, 327 N.E.2d 671, 677 (1975). FED. R.
EvmD. 706(a) recognizes the need of having expert rebuttal witnesses available by pro-
viding:
The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an
order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may
request the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert
witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its
own selection.
Rule 706(a) merely implements the court's well-established inherent powers to appoint
expert witnesses when necessary. Ex parte "Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920); 9 WIoMORE
§ 2484.
21. The first forensic use of voice spectrogram analysis involved the perjury of a
New York policeman. See Note, Voiceprint Method of Identification-Reluctance of
the Courts Toward Acceptance of Evidence, 12 N.Y.L.F. 501 (1966), citing People v.
Straehle (index 9323/64 Sup. Ct., Westchester County 1966) (unpublished decision).
State v. Cary, 99 NJ. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680 (Super. Ct. 1968), aff'd per curlam,
56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970), was the leading appellate decision on the issue before
Prof. Tosi published the results of his experiments. The New Jersey Superior Court held
that "[t]his technique [voice spectogram analysis] has not . . . as of this date attained
such degree of scientific acceptance and reliability as to be acceptable as evidence." 99
N.J. Super. at 333, 239 A.2d at 685. In People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 478 (1968), the court in a limited holding stated that the process "has not reached
a sufficient level of scientific certainty to be accepted as identification evidence in cases
where the life or liberty of a defendant may be at stake." Id. at 460, 72 Cal. Rptr.
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publication of Dr. Tosi's study, nine of eleven courts have admitted such
testimony into evidence, finding that it met the Frye standard.22
Commentators have criticized the Frye test for unduly limiting the
admissibility of testimony based upon scientific techniques.23 Dean
McCormick suggested a less restrictive test that would admit "relevant
conclusions" by an expert24 unless there were strong reasons for exclud-
at 493. Contra, United States v. Wright, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967)
(voice spectrogram analysis held admissible on theory that complete agreement among
experts not necessary).
22. Before Baller three federal courts had held the testimony to be admissible, stat-
ing that the technique had achieved general scientific acceptance: United States v.
Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1042 (1975); United States v.
Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (evidence held admissible at a parole revoca-
tion hearing); United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972), affd on
other grounds sub nom. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Appellate courts in three states admitted testimony based upon the results of voice
spectrogram analysis. Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (ad-
missible for corroborative purposes and to establish probable cause); Alea v. State, 265
So. 2d 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (admissible, but court specifically noted that the
judgment of the trial court did not rest solely on voice spectrogram evidence); Common-
wealth v. Lykus, - Mass. -, 327 N.E.2d 671 (1975) (admissible, but subject to closest
judicial scrutiny when no corroborative evidence introduced); State ex rel. Trimble v.
Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971) (admissible to corroborate voice iden-
tification by ear). In State v. Andretta, 61 NJ. 544, 296 A.2d 644 (1972), the New
Jersey Supreme Court indicated that it was willing to review its previous rejection of
the technique, State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680 (Super. CL 1968), aff'd
per curiam, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970), and returned the matter to the trial court.
The California courts of appeals are divided. Compare Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.
App. 3d 778, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547 (Ct. App. 1973) (voice spectrogram analysis has re-
ceived general scientific acceptance by recognized experts in the field), with People v.
Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708 (Ct. App. 1974) (evidence held inadmissi-
ble to prove identity of disguised voice).
The testimony of Dr. Tosi and Lt. Nash has been influential in the courts' decisions
to admit into evidence expert testimony based upon the results of voice spectrogram
analysis. In the following cases both Dr. Tosi and Lt. Nash testified: United States
v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972); Alea v. State, 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1972); Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Common-
wealth v. Lykus, - Mass. -, 327 N.E.2d 671 (1975); State v. Andretta, 61 N.J. 544,
296 A.2d 644 (1972). Lieutenant Nash was the prosecution's expert witness in United
States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp.
44 (ED. Pa. 1974), and State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d
432 (1971).
23. See McCORMICK § 203; J. RIcHARDSON, supra note 15, at § 6.18; Dabrowski,
The Polygraph Revisited: An Argument for Admissibility, 6 CrIM. L. BuLL. 63, 71
(1970).
24. "General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition for taking judicial no-
tice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence. Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert
witness should be received unless there are other reasons for exclusion. . . .
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ing the testimony.25 Under the McCormick standard the trier of fact is
given the sole responsibility of determining the reliability of the scientific
technique.26 Rule 702 of the new Federal Rules of Evidence adopts the
McCormick standard.
MCCORMICK § 203, at 491.
Dean McCormick argued that this less restrictive standard would allow into evidence
expert opinion based upon the results of newly discovered scientific methods that would
otherwise be excluded under Frye:
If the courts used this approach, instead of repeating a supposed requirement
of 'general acceptance' not elsewhere imposed, [referring to the standard
applied to all other expert opinion] they would arrive at a practical way of
utilizing the results of scientific advances.
Id. (emphasis added).
25. "Probative value may be overborne by the familiar dangers of prejudicing or
misleading the jury, and undue consumption of time." Id. See E. FIsCH, Nnw Yom
EVIDENCE 3-5 (1959); 1 E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 183-88 (1961);
J. THAYER, PRuIMINAY TpATsE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 264-65, 530 (1898);
Slough, supra note 14, at 15.
26. Since the McCormick standard dispenses with the requirement that the court
find the technique has achieved general scientific acceptance, once a witness is qualified
as an expert the reliability of his technique becomes an issue to be decided by the jury.
See MCCORMICK § 53; 9 WiOMoRE § 2549.
27. The federal rule, which took effect on July 1, 1975, adopted a liberal approach:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier offact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness quali-
fied as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the norm of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. Evm. 702 (emphasis added).
The Advisory Committee's Note to the Federal Rules of Evidence stated that
"fw]hether the situation is a proper one for the use of expert testimony is to be deter-
mined on the basis of assisting the trier" of fact. Advisory Committee's Note, FED. R.
EviD. 702, 28 U.S.C.A. Federal Rules of Evidence, at 463. In testimony before the
House Judiciary Committee on rule 702, Mr. Edward Cleary, the reporter for the Ad-
visory Committee, stated that the "test is phrased in terms of helpfulness in understand-
ing the evidence and determining facts in issue." Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the
Special Subcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 256 (1973). The new Federal Rules of Evidence,
then, adopt a much less rigorous standard of "assisting the trier of fact" to replace the
Frye requirement of "general scientific acceptance."
In adopting the standard advocated by Dean McCormick, the new Federal Rules of
Evidence are following the broad test suggested in 1949 by the Model Code of Evidence:
"In testifying to what he has perceived [an expert] witness .. . may give his testimony
in terms which include inferences and may state all relevant inferences .... " Model
Code of Evidence rule 402 (1949) (emphasis added).
Uniform Rule 56 is not as broadly stated, and instead grants the judge a broad discre-
tionary power to exclude expert testimony:
If the witness is testifying as an expert, testimony of the witness in the form
of opinions or inferences is limited to such opinions as the Judge finds are (a)
based on facts or data perceived by or personally made known to the witness
at the hearing ...
Uniform Rules of Evidence rule 56(2) (1953) (emphasis added).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss3/5
VOICE SPECTROGRAM ANALYSIS
In United States v. Baller, 8 the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that not
every scientific technique should be recognized as the basis for an
expert's testimony since opinions based on scientific techniques often
carry "undue weight with the trier of fact"29 and are difficult to rebut
without the use of testimony of other experts.30 The court, however,
rejected the Frye test, stating that the standard of admissibility should
not require a general consensus in the scientific community. 1 Instead,
the court adopted the McCormick standard, adding two protective
conditions: there must be "a demonstrable, objective procedure for
reaching the opinion '32 and "qualified persons who can either duplicate
the result or criticize the means by which it was reached."38 The court
explained that these additional requirements were devised "to prevent
deception or mistake and to allow the possibility of effective response." 34
Since "'[e]very useful new development must have its first day in
court,' "5 the court concluded that testimony based upon relevant scien-
tific evidence should be admitted in the same manner as other expert
testimony, and its weight attacked by cross-examination and refuta-
tion.86
The Baller opinion is commendable for balancing the great impact
that scientifically grounded testimony may have on the jury3 7 against
the need for admitting into evidence testimony based on the results of
newly developed scientific techniques.3 The standard of admissibility
devised by the court, however, was insufficient to protect against the
probative dangers of expert testimony based on voice spectrogram anal-
ysis. First, by leaving the jury the task of assessing the weight of
28. 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975).
29. Id. at 466. See note 21 supra.
30. 519 F.2d at466.
31. Id. See United States v. Wright, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967).
32. 519 F.2d at 466.
33. Id. The court felt that even though the defense presented no expert rebuttal
witnesses this requirement was met because "[c]ompetent witnesses were available to ex-
pose its limitations, and the defense was furnished with the names of other experts who
could conduct their own analyses of the tapes." Id.
34. Id., citing United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United
States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431
(6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971). Although these cases discussed the
Frye test extensively, they applied the standard without any additional requirements.
35. 519 F.2d at 466, quoting United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
36. 519 F.2d at 466.
37. See note 19 supra.
38. See note 24 supra.
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the evidence the court assumed a sophistication that juries may not pos-
sess. 9 Second, voice spectrogram analysis, a relatively new field,4" has
a very limited number of experts41 so that the court's requirement that
there be qualified persons available to challenge expert opinion may
not be satisfied.42  Finally, Dr. Tosi's study of the reliability of voice
spectrogram analysis significantly influenced the court.48  The study
has been strongly criticized and should not have been considered con-
clusive without independent verification.44
39. The jury evolved because of the public's hesitance "'to entrust plenary powers
over the life and property of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges.'" United
States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975), quoting Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). Nevertheless,
[t]he jury's potential for inaccuracy surpasses that of any other legal institu-
tion assigned a decision-making task. Since it is convened on an ad-hoc basis
to sit in one or a few cases, it lacks even the kind of general competence in
weighing evidence and deliberation that judges acquire by training and contin-
uity of service.
Kom, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 COLum. L. REv. 1080, 1104 (1966).
40. See note 5 supra.
41. The number of voice spectrogram experts who have testified in the reported
cases is small: L. Gerstman, C.U.N.Y.; L. Kersta, Voiceprint Laboratories, Somerville,
New Jersey; P. Ladefoged, U.C.L.A.; E. Nash, Michigan State Police; and 0. Tosi, Mich-
igan State University.
42. With such a small number of voice spectrogram experts it is not surprising that
in approximately 80 percent of the reported cases in which such testimony was admitted
there was no expert witness called by the defense to rebut or contradict the government's
witnesses. People v. Chapter, 13 CRam. LAw RP-R. 2479 (Marin County, Cal., Super.
Ct. July 23, 1973). But see People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478
(1968) (seven defense witnesses, experts in the general field of acoustics, questioned the
reliability of spectrogram analysis).
43. The court approvingly cited Dr. Tosi's results published in 1972, and took spe-
cial notice of his claim of 98 percent accuracy for the technique:
[E]xtensive experiments on voice spectography has [sic] been conducted at
Michigan State University by Dr. Oscar Tosi . . .. It appears . . . that an
experienced operator would incorrectly identify a speaker approximately six
percent of the time. Subsequently, Dr. Tosi suggested refinements, employed
by Lt. Nash, which reduce the percentage of mistaken identifications to about
two percent.
519 F.2d at 465.
44. See Hazen, Effects of Differing Phonetic Contexts on Spectrographic Speaker
Identification, 54 J. Acousr. Soc. AM. 650, 658, 659 (1973). Hazen concluded
that "the forensic value of voice spectrograms for speaker identification purposes
is quite limited." Id. at 659. He specifically criticized Dr. Tosi's preparation of speech
samples and the substantial repetition of the known speaker contexts. Id. Other
acoustical experts found fault with Dr. Tosi's selection of speaker population and
the experiment's background noise conditions, and concluded: "Our interpretations of the
new data lead us to reiterate our previous conclusion: that the degree of reliability of
identification under practical conditions has not been scientifically established." Bolt,
Cooper, David, Denes, Pickett & Stevens, Speaker Identification by Speech Spectro-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss3/5
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Despite these problems in the court's reasoning, the Bailer opinion is
important in two respects. First, the court's adoption of the McCor-
mick test is a significant departure from precedent, and opens the door
of the Fourth Circuit to the admission of testimony based upon other
scientific techniques. Second, since rule 702 of the new Federal Rules
of Evidence adopts the McCormick standard,45 Bailer may indicate how
other courts will apply the rule. Other scientific techniques, such as
polygraph testing, that in the past have been excluded under the Frye
test,4" may be ruled admissible when freshly reviewed under the Mc-
Cormick standard and rule 702.
5mms: Some Further Observations, 54 J. Acousr. Soc. AM. 531, 535 (1973). For a list-
ig of a number of scientists who have criticized the reliability of the technique, see
Jones, Danger-Voiceprints Ahead, 11 AM. Ca.m. L. REv. 549, 569 n.120 (1973).
45. See note 27 supra.
46. The most obvious example of a scientific technique that in the past has not been
admitted in evidence under the Frye standard is polygraph testing. For an excellent
umnmary of recent decisions that have held inadmissible the results of a polygraph ex-
amination, see United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975). The polygraph
machine is actually a combination of devices that measure fluctuations in a person's
blood pressure, breathing, perspiration, and pulse. See J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note
18, at 3; J. RiCHAPDSON, supra note 15, at § 10.1; Skolnick, supra note 13, at 696. The
theory of polygraph testing is that a person's physiological state will reflect the emo-
tional state inherent in giving a wrong response to a question. Skolnick, supra note 13,
at 699-700. Even though the theory underlying the technique, the qualification and
methodology of the operator, and the reliability of the procedure have been the subject
of the closest scrutiny, see McCoRMicK § 207, the most common justification for the
uniform rejection of expert testimony based on the results of a polygraph examination
is that the technique is unreliable. H.R. REP. No. 198, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1965).
An accuracy rate of 95 percent has been reported for polygraph testing, see F. ImAu &
. REwm, supra note 13, at 72, a figure courts might find comparable to the 98 percent rate
claimed for voice spectrogram analysis in the experiment done by Dr. Tosi, see note 12
mpra. Under the McCormick standard, then, expert opinion based on the results of a
polygraph test may, like expert testimony based on the results of voice spectogram
analysis, be admissible in evidence. Since rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
has adopted the McCormick standard, see note 27 supra, federal courts might admit the
results of a polygraph examination. Accord, Rothstein, Some Themes in the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 FtD. BJ. 16, 25 (1974).
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